By: Stef Terblanche
To most casual observers expelling Jacob Zuma from the ANC for
supporting and leading a rival political party, the uMkhonto we Sizwe
Party (MKP), against his own party in the May 29 general election,
seemed like the only logical thing to do and that it would be the end of
the story. After all, it is unheard of that one can belong to two rival
parties at the same time, as much of the chatter on social media would
tell you. And from that perspective, the ANC had no choice but to expel
Zuma.
But that’s not where this story ends; there’s much more than meets
the eye… and it could yet come back to haunt the ANC, and its present
leader Cyril Ramaphosa, a whole lot more, it seems. And that would
naturally imply some shaking of the precariously stacked post-elections
political cards rearranged around a government of national unity (GNU)
led by the ANC with assistance from the Democratic Alliance (DA) and
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) on the one hand, and a parliamentary
opposition led by Zuma’s MKP with cooperation from the Economic Freedom
Fighters (EFF) within what is called the Progressive Caucus on the other
hand.
All the other small political parties on all sides of this divide are
really little more than bit players, some of whom sometimes get to play
the role of kingmaker and sometimes will add critically needed numbers
in various voting scenarios. To the big 5 political parties they are
reserve forces, or cannon fodder, called upon when needed.
And then there is also the extra-parliamentary dimension being built
by Zuma and his cohorts in the spheres of labour, a civic organisation,
an anticipated mass movement, and more, to rival the ANC-led tripartite
Alliance and add to the pressure on the ANC, and on Ramaphosa. However,
there are also potential limits to how far Zuma and the MKP may succeed
with this strategy. What seems certain at present is that in this
complex political landscape, Zuma’s MKP is likely to remain a force to
be reckoned with, and its impact on South African politics will continue
to unfold.
Previous ANC breakaways and the differences that set MKP apart from them
It’s worth noting that while previous ANC breakaway parties
eventually dwindled in significance, the MKP stands out due to its
unique origins. Unlike other breakaway parties, the MKP was not formed
directly from the ANC as a breakaway. Initially established by Jabulani
Khumalo, Zuma soon recognized its potential as a political vehicle to
further his vendetta against Cyril Ramaphosa and his faction of the ANC.
Zuma and his daughter, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, kicked out Khumalo and
effectively took over the MKP, leading to its electoral success and the
ANC’s subsequent expulsion of Zuma because of his dual membership.
Ironically, dual party membership is allowed by the ANC for its ally,
the SA Communist Party (SACP), to which Zuma also once belonged. And
the SACP has recently criticised Ramaphosa and the ANC for entering into
the GNU with the Democratic Alliance (DA) and other parties that it
claims are funded by “white monopoly capital” – criticism not much
different from that of the MKP.
While his dual membership was cited as the core reason behind his
expulsion, one gets the sense that it was equally driven by a sense of
revenge for the ANC’s recent electoral humiliation at the hands of the
MKP. What really stood out was that Zuma was a political juggernaut that
had severely harmed the ANC; he had to be reined in and punished.
Unlike past political parties that broke from the ANC, the driving
motive for the formation of the MKP and Zuma’s role in it, was not based
on policy differences with the ANC or seeking improved delivery. And
Zuma’s wanting to retain membership of the ANC, signalled an intent that
at some point he wanted to resume a role in the ANC, even if from
behind the scenes. His fight was not against the ANC per se, but against
“Ramaphosa’s ANC” – a faction led by Ramaphosa. In other words, in
Zuma’s view the ANC had to be rescued from Ramaphosa and his faction, a
mission to which Zuma saw himself being committed to. He would yet take
back “his ANC”.
One can speculate that Zuma may have been motivated to some extent by
a desire to regain access to and control of state resources as during
the corrupt state capture years, and to ensure that the corruption
charges against him would be dropped. But one can surmise that
ultimately Zuma’s motive was foremost pure and simple: revenge against
Ramaphosa leading to his and his faction’s political demise.
Factors that inform Zuma’s desire for revenge
Potentially Zuma’s expulsion from the ANC may have far-reaching
implications and possible consequences for the ANC, and understanding
his motivations and its potential impact is crucial. To fully understand
the complexities of Zuma’s desire for revenge and retribution and the
danger he poses for the ANC, the GNU, and the general current political
order, one needs to delve into the past.
Zuma has never forgiven Ramaphosa for toppling him from power at the
2017 national conference and in early 2018, even though term limits had
caught up with him. Zuma had hoped to remain the most powerful,
influential figure in the ANC from behind the scenes, using his anointed
proxy successor and ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to that end, but
Ramaphosa’s cleverly engineered rise to power thwarted those plans.
Victimization Narrative and Ethnic Base:
A litany of grudge events motivates Zuma and has caused him to
repeatedly bounce back to centre stage. These start with his axing as
deputy president by Thabo Mbeki way back in 2005 in connection with the
arms deal corruption, but became particularly defined by a later
succession of events that included his 2017 loss to the Ramaphosa camp;
his forced resignation as South Africa’s president early in 2018; the
resumption of his corruption trial shortly afterwards; the shutting down
by Ramaphosa of the MK Military Veterans’ Association, an important
part of Zuma’s power base; the persecution and voluntary exile of his
son, a Gupta associate; the prosecution of other Zuma allies while
tainted Ramaphosa allies seemingly remained in office; the findings
against Zuma and his allies by the Zondo Commission; Zuma’s arrest and
imprisonment for contempt of court connected to the Zondo inquiry; and
then the ultimate insult, expulsion from the ANC.
All of this fed into and fuelled Zuma’s narrative that he was the
victim of a conspiracy by the Ramaphosa-led faction, a narrative that
gained much traction and was eagerly embraced by his followers,
particularly among his ethnic Zulu followers in KwaZulu-Natal and other
areas with significant Zulu populations. His natural charisma and
extensive political networks play a major role, but the provincial
ethnic factor, including traditional leadership, is often overlooked due
to political correctness.
Zuma as a shrewd Political Strategist:
Zuma’s history includes bouncing back from adversity. He has faced a
rape trial, arms deal corruption charges, and was sacked as deputy
president by Thabo Mbeki. Yet, he leveraged his ethnic and provincial
power base, and with support from what would soon become known as his
own “radical economic transformation” (RET) faction of supporters in the
ANC, including the critical role played by the SACP and the ANC Youth
League, Mbeki was ousted, and Zuma became president. His ability to
mobilise support and navigate political landscapes should not be
underestimated.
Extra-Parliamentary Sphere and Riots:
Zuma’s influence extends beyond parliament. His incarceration in July
2021 triggered widespread riots and destruction, primarily in
KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng—provinces with concentrated Zulu support.
Despite attempts to downplay this, Zuma’s ethnic following played a
significant role. For the ANC and the GNU, this ability to mobilise his
followers on the streets, poses significant risk.
Zuma’s Status as “Political Royalty”:
Factors contributing to Zuma’s status of “political royalty” include
his time on Robben Island, underground roles during the armed struggle,
and involvement in Operation Vula which almost ended the start of
democratic constitutional negotiations in the early 1990s. His
leadership in KwaZulu-Natal during the province’s civil war between
supporters of the ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and his
peace-making role, further solidified his position. Zuma’s enigmatic
charisma resonates with his followers, especially in KwaZulu-Natal.
In summary, Zuma’s dual role as a revenge-driven figure coupled to
being a skilled and shrewd political operator poses a danger to the ANC
and President Ramaphosa. His ability to mobilise support and influence
events both within and beyond parliament warrants close attention and
carries much risk for the ANC as well as the GNU. Being expelled from
“his” ANC is the ultimate insult, and few things will energise the
82-year-old Zuma more than this to exact his revenge and “save” the ANC
from Ramaphosa.
However, to only equate Zuma with a smouldering desire for revenge,
is to completely underestimate Zuma the political strategist and
operator. Both elements pose danger to the ANC in their own right, but
together they may fuel a destructive force.
What danger does Zuma pose to Ramaphosa and the ANC?
Zuma has already repeatedly demonstrated his ability to politically
bounce back to centre stage. Ever since his ouster following the ANC’s
December 2017 national conference, Zuma has continuously been able to
hog the political spotlight from where he repeatedly attacked Ramaphosa
and “Ramaphosa’s ANC”, building both his “victim” narrative and his
support base and platform for further aaction against Ramaphosa and
“Ramaphosa’s ANC”. He has also already shown that he can rely on
extra-parliamentary mass mobilisation to support him and further his
agenda. So, that he and his MKP bounced back once again and captured
14.58% of the national vote and 58 seats in the National Assembly,
becoming the third biggest party in just 5 months of its existence,
while also capturing by far the most votes in KwaZulu-Natal with 45.93%,
far more than any other political party could achieve, should not have
come as a surprise. In the process it was largely the MKP that reduced
the ANC’s majority from 57.5% won in 2019 to a mere 40% this year.
It’s patently clear that Zuma is capable of making repeated political
comebacks. That the ANC fears Zuma and his MKP, is clear from its
election-defeat self-assessments and post mortems in which Zuma and the
MKP’s role have been fully recognised. And the sense of defeat, loss and
destruction wreaked on the ANC by Zuma’s MKP is also clear from
statements such as, “it’s now a case of do or die for the ANC” and “we
will rise from the ashes”.
What may happen next?
Given the above background, it is not without justification that a
number of voices are warning that the ANC will come to regret Zuma’s
expulsion. Among them are his brother, Khanya Zuma, who maintains that
“the ANC has been sold to the highest bidder and no one can rescue it
now… except of course his brother. Zuma and his cohorts have already
significantly established the narrative that Ramaphosa sold out to or is
beholden to the Stellenbosch-centred “white monopoly capital mafia”, a
figment created by the corrupt Gupta brothers’ London-based PR agency at
the height of state capture in an attempt to exonerate Zuma.
Not forming a provincial coalition government with other parties in
KwaZulu-Natal after the recent elections was a tactical mistake that
Zuma will want to rectify. Attaining political power and influence
through formal constitutional and institutional means as well as on the
streets, with the end result being Ramaphosa’s removal, are likely to
define his future actions. Most likely he will target the following
approaches:
- Driving the Phala Phala persecution: Zuma and the
MKP will partner with the EFF in its current drive to reopen the
parliamentary and police investigations into the Phala Phala to add
pressure on Ramaphosa.
- Alienating Alliance partners: With the SACP and
COSATU already critical of Ramaphosa having formed a GNU with “white
monopoly capital” funded parties, Zuma may seek to further drive a wedge
between Ramaphosa/ANC/GNU and the alliance partners, the ultimate goal
being the GNU’s failure and disbandment.
- Manipulating organised labour: In the labour
relations arena Zuma will most likely seek to weaken COSATU and its
affiliated unions, and on the other he will feed into COSATU’s already
articulated fears that under DA pressure Ramaphosa’s GNU will weaken
workers’ and unions’ rights. It’s no coincidence that Zuma and the MKP
have already launched a teachers’ union to take on COSATU’s biggest and
third biggest unions which both organise teachers and other education
sector workers and represent more than 530,000 members, or about half of
COSATU’s 1,2 million members.
- Ideological focus: Zuma is already positioning
himself and the MKP as the true revolutionary torchbearers of “the
people” who are advancing “radical economic transformation” (RET) and
the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), while “Ramaphosa’s ANC” has
sold out to “white monopoily capital”, that figment of invention by the
now defunct lilywhite London PR firm that served the Guptas. Already
feeling the pressure in this regard, the ANC has lately been at pains to
stress its continued commitment to the NDR, something that will sit
uneasy with the GNU partners.
- Civic and extra-parliamentary movements: The MKP
has already launched a civic organisation, the Progressive Civics
Congress, as a rival to the ANC-allied SA National Civics Congress
(SANCO) and will seek to weaken the ANC and divide its allies in this
sphere too. In addition, Zuma has promised the future formation of an
additional extra-parliamentary movement to supplement political pressure
on the GNU by the parliamentary Progressive Caucus it shares with the
EFF.
- KwaZulu-Natal provincial government: Zuma may seek
to rectify the MKP’s earlier mistake by not going for government in the
province and may seek to undermine the provincial unity government (PGU)
of the IFP, DA, ANC and NFP, zeroing in on the latter party in
particular to draw it out the of the PGU and undermining the ANC
wherever it can.
- 2026 municipal elections: This is the next terrain
of electoral battle where the MKP will seek to consolidate its dominance
in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and gain a stronger national foothold,
particularly in Gauteng and Mpumalanga, at the ANC’s expense. In KZN
Zuma’s extensive political network and his carefully nurtured
relationship with traditional leadership, will be a critical factor.
- Progressive Caucus in Parliament: Working together
with the EFF in the Progressive Caucus in Parliament – effectively the
official Opposition – Zuma and the MKP will exert maximum pressure on
Ramaphosa, the ANC and the GNU from within this platform.
There are limiting factors to consider too. Zuma doesn’t have time on
his side given his age and it seems unlikely his daughter has what it
takes to successfully take over the reins and direct the MKP’s resources
and energy to fighting Ramaphosa on behalf of her father’s legacy. Most
likely his departure would result in a renewed fight for control of the
MKP that could precede its rapid decline. In other possible limiting
developments Zuma could become tied up in his corruption trial, or
voters may grow tired of the radical rhetoric and tendencies, or Zuma
may simply withdraw and focus on building the MKP.
It’s impossible to know exactly how Zuma and his MKP will respond to
his expulsion and the build-up of all the other humiliations, or what
exactly the future might hold for him and his MKP. But it seems
plausibly sure that the ANC and Ramaphosa will ignore at their own
peril, the possibility that Zuma will come charging back, a destructive
juggernaut bent on revenge and redemption, with little real regard for
the plight of the masses that will help him in his quest or for what it
may cost the country as a whole. That creates dangerous conditions.
