Article written for Democracy Development Programme and posted on their website on 6 August 2024.
By: Stef Terblanche
To most casual observers expelling Jacob Zuma from the ANC for supporting and leading a rival political party, the uMkhonto we Sizwe Party (MKP), against his own party in the May 29 general election, seemed like the only logical thing to do and that it would be the end of the story. After all, it is unheard of that one can belong to two rival parties at the same time, as much of the chatter on social media would tell you. And from that perspective, the ANC had no choice but to expel Zuma.
But that’s not where this story ends; there’s much more than meets the eye… and it could yet come back to haunt the ANC, and its present leader Cyril Ramaphosa, a whole lot more, it seems. And that would naturally imply some shaking of the precariously stacked post-elections political cards rearranged around a government of national unity (GNU) led by the ANC with assistance from the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) on the one hand, and a parliamentary opposition led by Zuma’s MKP with cooperation from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) within what is called the Progressive Caucus on the other hand.
All the other small political parties on all sides of this divide are really little more than bit players, some of whom sometimes get to play the role of kingmaker and sometimes will add critically needed numbers in various voting scenarios. To the big 5 political parties they are reserve forces, or cannon fodder, called upon when needed.
And then there is also the extra-parliamentary dimension being built by Zuma and his cohorts in the spheres of labour, a civic organisation, an anticipated mass movement, and more, to rival the ANC-led tripartite Alliance and add to the pressure on the ANC, and on Ramaphosa. However, there are also potential limits to how far Zuma and the MKP may succeed with this strategy. What seems certain at present is that in this complex political landscape, Zuma’s MKP is likely to remain a force to be reckoned with, and its impact on South African politics will continue to unfold.
Previous ANC breakaways and the differences that set MKP apart from them
It’s worth noting that while previous ANC breakaway parties eventually dwindled in significance, the MKP stands out due to its unique origins. Unlike other breakaway parties, the MKP was not formed directly from the ANC as a breakaway. Initially established by Jabulani Khumalo, Zuma soon recognized its potential as a political vehicle to further his vendetta against Cyril Ramaphosa and his faction of the ANC. Zuma and his daughter, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, kicked out Khumalo and effectively took over the MKP, leading to its electoral success and the ANC’s subsequent expulsion of Zuma because of his dual membership.
Ironically, dual party membership is allowed by the ANC for its ally, the SA Communist Party (SACP), to which Zuma also once belonged. And the SACP has recently criticised Ramaphosa and the ANC for entering into the GNU with the Democratic Alliance (DA) and other parties that it claims are funded by “white monopoly capital” – criticism not much different from that of the MKP.
While his dual membership was cited as the core reason behind his expulsion, one gets the sense that it was equally driven by a sense of revenge for the ANC’s recent electoral humiliation at the hands of the MKP. What really stood out was that Zuma was a political juggernaut that had severely harmed the ANC; he had to be reined in and punished.
Unlike past political parties that broke from the ANC, the driving motive for the formation of the MKP and Zuma’s role in it, was not based on policy differences with the ANC or seeking improved delivery. And Zuma’s wanting to retain membership of the ANC, signalled an intent that at some point he wanted to resume a role in the ANC, even if from behind the scenes. His fight was not against the ANC per se, but against “Ramaphosa’s ANC” – a faction led by Ramaphosa. In other words, in Zuma’s view the ANC had to be rescued from Ramaphosa and his faction, a mission to which Zuma saw himself being committed to. He would yet take back “his ANC”.
One can speculate that Zuma may have been motivated to some extent by a desire to regain access to and control of state resources as during the corrupt state capture years, and to ensure that the corruption charges against him would be dropped. But one can surmise that ultimately Zuma’s motive was foremost pure and simple: revenge against Ramaphosa leading to his and his faction’s political demise.
Factors that inform Zuma’s desire for revenge
Potentially Zuma’s expulsion from the ANC may have far-reaching implications and possible consequences for the ANC, and understanding his motivations and its potential impact is crucial. To fully understand the complexities of Zuma’s desire for revenge and retribution and the danger he poses for the ANC, the GNU, and the general current political order, one needs to delve into the past.
Zuma has never forgiven Ramaphosa for toppling him from power at the 2017 national conference and in early 2018, even though term limits had caught up with him. Zuma had hoped to remain the most powerful, influential figure in the ANC from behind the scenes, using his anointed proxy successor and ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to that end, but Ramaphosa’s cleverly engineered rise to power thwarted those plans.
Victimization Narrative and Ethnic Base:
A litany of grudge events motivates Zuma and has caused him to repeatedly bounce back to centre stage. These start with his axing as deputy president by Thabo Mbeki way back in 2005 in connection with the arms deal corruption, but became particularly defined by a later succession of events that included his 2017 loss to the Ramaphosa camp; his forced resignation as South Africa’s president early in 2018; the resumption of his corruption trial shortly afterwards; the shutting down by Ramaphosa of the MK Military Veterans’ Association, an important part of Zuma’s power base; the persecution and voluntary exile of his son, a Gupta associate; the prosecution of other Zuma allies while tainted Ramaphosa allies seemingly remained in office; the findings against Zuma and his allies by the Zondo Commission; Zuma’s arrest and imprisonment for contempt of court connected to the Zondo inquiry; and then the ultimate insult, expulsion from the ANC.
All of this fed into and fuelled Zuma’s narrative that he was the victim of a conspiracy by the Ramaphosa-led faction, a narrative that gained much traction and was eagerly embraced by his followers, particularly among his ethnic Zulu followers in KwaZulu-Natal and other areas with significant Zulu populations. His natural charisma and extensive political networks play a major role, but the provincial ethnic factor, including traditional leadership, is often overlooked due to political correctness.
Zuma as a shrewd Political Strategist:
Zuma’s history includes bouncing back from adversity. He has faced a rape trial, arms deal corruption charges, and was sacked as deputy president by Thabo Mbeki. Yet, he leveraged his ethnic and provincial power base, and with support from what would soon become known as his own “radical economic transformation” (RET) faction of supporters in the ANC, including the critical role played by the SACP and the ANC Youth League, Mbeki was ousted, and Zuma became president. His ability to mobilise support and navigate political landscapes should not be underestimated.
Extra-Parliamentary Sphere and Riots:
Zuma’s influence extends beyond parliament. His incarceration in July 2021 triggered widespread riots and destruction, primarily in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng—provinces with concentrated Zulu support. Despite attempts to downplay this, Zuma’s ethnic following played a significant role. For the ANC and the GNU, this ability to mobilise his followers on the streets, poses significant risk.
Zuma’s Status as “Political Royalty”:
Factors contributing to Zuma’s status of “political royalty” include his time on Robben Island, underground roles during the armed struggle, and involvement in Operation Vula which almost ended the start of democratic constitutional negotiations in the early 1990s. His leadership in KwaZulu-Natal during the province’s civil war between supporters of the ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and his peace-making role, further solidified his position. Zuma’s enigmatic charisma resonates with his followers, especially in KwaZulu-Natal.
In summary, Zuma’s dual role as a revenge-driven figure coupled to being a skilled and shrewd political operator poses a danger to the ANC and President Ramaphosa. His ability to mobilise support and influence events both within and beyond parliament warrants close attention and carries much risk for the ANC as well as the GNU. Being expelled from “his” ANC is the ultimate insult, and few things will energise the 82-year-old Zuma more than this to exact his revenge and “save” the ANC from Ramaphosa.
However, to only equate Zuma with a smouldering desire for revenge, is to completely underestimate Zuma the political strategist and operator. Both elements pose danger to the ANC in their own right, but together they may fuel a destructive force.
What danger does Zuma pose to Ramaphosa and the ANC?
Zuma has already repeatedly demonstrated his ability to politically bounce back to centre stage. Ever since his ouster following the ANC’s December 2017 national conference, Zuma has continuously been able to hog the political spotlight from where he repeatedly attacked Ramaphosa and “Ramaphosa’s ANC”, building both his “victim” narrative and his support base and platform for further aaction against Ramaphosa and “Ramaphosa’s ANC”. He has also already shown that he can rely on extra-parliamentary mass mobilisation to support him and further his agenda. So, that he and his MKP bounced back once again and captured 14.58% of the national vote and 58 seats in the National Assembly, becoming the third biggest party in just 5 months of its existence, while also capturing by far the most votes in KwaZulu-Natal with 45.93%, far more than any other political party could achieve, should not have come as a surprise. In the process it was largely the MKP that reduced the ANC’s majority from 57.5% won in 2019 to a mere 40% this year.
It’s patently clear that Zuma is capable of making repeated political comebacks. That the ANC fears Zuma and his MKP, is clear from its election-defeat self-assessments and post mortems in which Zuma and the MKP’s role have been fully recognised. And the sense of defeat, loss and destruction wreaked on the ANC by Zuma’s MKP is also clear from statements such as, “it’s now a case of do or die for the ANC” and “we will rise from the ashes”.
What may happen next?
Given the above background, it is not without justification that a number of voices are warning that the ANC will come to regret Zuma’s expulsion. Among them are his brother, Khanya Zuma, who maintains that “the ANC has been sold to the highest bidder and no one can rescue it now… except of course his brother. Zuma and his cohorts have already significantly established the narrative that Ramaphosa sold out to or is beholden to the Stellenbosch-centred “white monopoly capital mafia”, a figment created by the corrupt Gupta brothers’ London-based PR agency at the height of state capture in an attempt to exonerate Zuma.
Not forming a provincial coalition government with other parties in KwaZulu-Natal after the recent elections was a tactical mistake that Zuma will want to rectify. Attaining political power and influence through formal constitutional and institutional means as well as on the streets, with the end result being Ramaphosa’s removal, are likely to define his future actions. Most likely he will target the following approaches:
- Driving the Phala Phala persecution: Zuma and the MKP will partner with the EFF in its current drive to reopen the parliamentary and police investigations into the Phala Phala to add pressure on Ramaphosa.
- Alienating Alliance partners: With the SACP and COSATU already critical of Ramaphosa having formed a GNU with “white monopoly capital” funded parties, Zuma may seek to further drive a wedge between Ramaphosa/ANC/GNU and the alliance partners, the ultimate goal being the GNU’s failure and disbandment.
- Manipulating organised labour: In the labour relations arena Zuma will most likely seek to weaken COSATU and its affiliated unions, and on the other he will feed into COSATU’s already articulated fears that under DA pressure Ramaphosa’s GNU will weaken workers’ and unions’ rights. It’s no coincidence that Zuma and the MKP have already launched a teachers’ union to take on COSATU’s biggest and third biggest unions which both organise teachers and other education sector workers and represent more than 530,000 members, or about half of COSATU’s 1,2 million members.
- Ideological focus: Zuma is already positioning himself and the MKP as the true revolutionary torchbearers of “the people” who are advancing “radical economic transformation” (RET) and the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), while “Ramaphosa’s ANC” has sold out to “white monopoily capital”, that figment of invention by the now defunct lilywhite London PR firm that served the Guptas. Already feeling the pressure in this regard, the ANC has lately been at pains to stress its continued commitment to the NDR, something that will sit uneasy with the GNU partners.
- Civic and extra-parliamentary movements: The MKP has already launched a civic organisation, the Progressive Civics Congress, as a rival to the ANC-allied SA National Civics Congress (SANCO) and will seek to weaken the ANC and divide its allies in this sphere too. In addition, Zuma has promised the future formation of an additional extra-parliamentary movement to supplement political pressure on the GNU by the parliamentary Progressive Caucus it shares with the EFF.
- KwaZulu-Natal provincial government: Zuma may seek to rectify the MKP’s earlier mistake by not going for government in the province and may seek to undermine the provincial unity government (PGU) of the IFP, DA, ANC and NFP, zeroing in on the latter party in particular to draw it out the of the PGU and undermining the ANC wherever it can.
- 2026 municipal elections: This is the next terrain of electoral battle where the MKP will seek to consolidate its dominance in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and gain a stronger national foothold, particularly in Gauteng and Mpumalanga, at the ANC’s expense. In KZN Zuma’s extensive political network and his carefully nurtured relationship with traditional leadership, will be a critical factor.
- Progressive Caucus in Parliament: Working together with the EFF in the Progressive Caucus in Parliament – effectively the official Opposition – Zuma and the MKP will exert maximum pressure on Ramaphosa, the ANC and the GNU from within this platform.
There are limiting factors to consider too. Zuma doesn’t have time on his side given his age and it seems unlikely his daughter has what it takes to successfully take over the reins and direct the MKP’s resources and energy to fighting Ramaphosa on behalf of her father’s legacy. Most likely his departure would result in a renewed fight for control of the MKP that could precede its rapid decline. In other possible limiting developments Zuma could become tied up in his corruption trial, or voters may grow tired of the radical rhetoric and tendencies, or Zuma may simply withdraw and focus on building the MKP.
It’s impossible to know exactly how Zuma and his MKP will respond to his expulsion and the build-up of all the other humiliations, or what exactly the future might hold for him and his MKP. But it seems plausibly sure that the ANC and Ramaphosa will ignore at their own peril, the possibility that Zuma will come charging back, a destructive juggernaut bent on revenge and redemption, with little real regard for the plight of the masses that will help him in his quest or for what it may cost the country as a whole. That creates dangerous conditions.
