The potential
makings of debilitating tensions and possible collapse in the GNU – After the Government of National
Unity (GNU) got off to a seemingly good start these past few months –
strengthening investor confidence and the rand and injecting new optimism about
the economy – it seems at this stage it would be wrong to let euphoria cloud
our better judgement on the GNU (just as Ramaphoria once led the entire country
up the garden path). It’s going to be a rocky road to longer-term success, if
success comes at all for the GNU. There are still a number of very sticky
points to be resolved: the BELA Act clauses to which the DA and others object;
the National Health Insurance scheme; who makes and speaks on policy on behalf
of the GNU; and implementation of the conflict resolving mechanism supposed
under Deputy President Paul Mashatile’s command. But the biggest and most
unexpected threat right now, comes in the form of contradictory foreign policy
interpretations and views – these could quite easily yet become the stick that
will break the GNU camel’s back. That is, within the context of seeking
consensus on important decisions and having deadlocks untied by the built-in
dispute mechanism chaired by Mashatile.
Further context
involved is the question of who can make what policy statements on behalf of
the GNU. This illustrates the difficulties experienced by parties in the GNU to
become accustomed to the new rules and work within such unfamiliar parameters –
it’s still very much a learning curve. However, there may also be hidden
agendas at work, particularly in respect of an ANC that finds it difficult to
accept that it can no longer unilaterally call the shots. The ANC is rather
mischievously imposing its own foreign policy programme without consulting the
other parties or accommodating their views. It has done so when President
Ramaphosa told Russian President Vladimir Putin at last week’s BRICS summit
that South Africa viewed Russia as a valued ally and friend who “supported us
right from the beginning, from the days of our struggle against apartheid”.
The ANC also unilaterally
pushed its own foreign policy agenda when it insisted it will not change its
position on Palestine and Israel, with International Relations and Cooperation
Minister Ronald Lamola (ANC), saying South Africa’s memorial, or substantive
charge sheet of facts to be filed with the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
today, contains more evidence, in “forensic detail”, to show that South Africa
had not just put a plausible case of genocide before the court, but that it
could now prove that it was indeed genocide. This contradicts the views of
several other GNU parties. It also contradicts the ANC’s own “non-alignment”
foreign policy. And it contradicts an earlier declaration by Lamola and
supported by all GNU parties that South Africa’s foreign policy would in future
be determined by what was best for the economy and its growth. By that it was
understood that future foreign policy, among other things, would not antagonise
South Africa’s major trading partners, particularly Washington and the US
Congress where moves had already begun to isolate South Africa in retribution
for its support to and close relations with Russia, China, Iran, Hamas and
others.
● DA leader and GNU agriculture minister
John Steenhuisen is quite correct in objecting to Ramaphosa’s statement to
Putin, made on an international stage, about Russian friendship and support. In
the first instance, it was a unilateral ANC foreign policy pronouncement that
failed to seek prior support through consultation from other GNU parties and as
such flouted the commitment to seeking maximum consensus on policy and other
issues to which all GNU parties had signed up. It may not always be a very
practical commitment, but it is a commitment nonetheless without which the GNU
will fall apart. As it is, a number of GNU parties have no love for Russia
after its invasion of Ukraine.
Secondly, it
is a party matter for the ANC and not a government issue to which the whole
country can be tied, as Ramaphosa did. It was the ANC and certainly not South
Africa that had historical friendship and support relations with Russia as part
of the former Soviet Union, and while the ANC may view Russia as a current
friend, much of South Africa doesn’t. For the record, the ANC had such
relations in equal measure with Ukraine when it too was still part of the
Soviet Union, yet the ANC now tends to recognise only Russia in this respect.
Thirdly, Steenhuisen was also correct in saying Ramaphosa could have made a
more pragmatic statement so as not to again antagonise South Africa’s major
trading partners. There is still legislation pending in Washington that could
have highly negative consequences for South Africa. Ever since the mysterious
midnight visit of a Russian ship to Simonstown and South Africa’s very public
and obvious favouring of Putin and Russia to Ukraine’s detriment, the ANC has
been pursuing a foreign policy that is potentially most harmful to South
Africa.
And fourthly,
this kind of policy jostling is dragging other countries and issues into South
Africa’s domestic GNU battles. For one, DA Home Affairs Minister Leon Schreiber,
in an obvious retaliation to Ramaphosa’s pro-Russian statement, declared on
social media on Sunday, just days after the BRICS summit, that he had signed a
“historic” agreement granting visa free access to South Africa for Ukrainian
holders of diplomatic, official and service passports and vice versa. This
comes on the eve of Minister Lamola hosting a Ukrainian delegation, very much
minus the publicity and fanfare usually reserved for Russian visits.
Schreiber’s made his statement only for Ramaphosa’s spokesman Vincent Magwenya
to repudiate Schreiber and question his actions, saying that Ramaphosa had not
yet given his consent to any such signing.
To add insult
to injury, Schreiber had used the exact same words that Ramaphosa had used in
respect of Russia, to describe South Africa’s “historic” relationship with
Ukraine. Schreiber’s words: “We continue to see Ukraine as a valued ally, as a
valued friend, who supported us right from the beginning, from the days of our
struggle against apartheid, right through to now.” And Ramaphosa’s words to
Putin (for comparison): “We continue to see Russia as a valued ally, as a
valued friend who supported us right from the beginning, from the days of our
struggle against apartheid”. While this may be seen by the two parties as the
DA throwing down the gauntlet to Ramaphosa and the ANC, Ukraine certainly
doesn’t deserve being treated like some geopolitical football by a small
African country thousands of miles away from the already unbearable pressures
it has to endure in its resistance to Russia’s bloody invasion.
At the same
time as all of this played out, there seems to be a tendency in the ANC that it
can wear down its former opponents who are current “allies” in the GNU in the
longer run by tying them into the GNU with positions, perks and delusions of
power, while simply continuing to call the shots and promote ANC policies. A
stubborn DA which wants to exercise its own maximum measure of power and
important decisions in the GNU, of course won’t stand for it. And the other 8
GNU parties are caught up in the middle. The result will be growing tensions if
they are not careful, that will ultimately cause the collapse of the GNU,
because without the DA and its support numbers there, the GNU will become a
weak and toothless institution and will lack the numbers to push important
decisions through Parliament, even despite it most likely then inviting the EFF
to join the GNU. This a developing story and potential threat to the GNU.
