Zuma and MKP a disruptive but decisive election factor that could advance a radical leftwing coalition…

 

 Extract from my Political Research Note to clients, 9 May 2024

With little over two weeks to go to the 2024 elections, the political future of South Africa remains balanced on a knife’s edge of uncertainty – critical developments and factors could still tip the scales in any direction before the elections, as I have previously cautioned. The fate of Jacob Zuma and his uMkhonto we Sizwe Party (MKP) is one such a factor. Meanwhile, if Zuma and the MKP remain in the race and coupled to the projections of opinion polls assuming they are on target, it could bolster the chances of a radical leftwing coalition governing South Africa after 29 May. If they leave the race, a different scenario opens up. A major decisive factor in this saga could present itself as early as tomorrow, Friday 10 May, in the Constitutional Court.

 

A number of recent and ongoing developments around Zuma and the MKP could have a decisive impact on the outcome of the elections one way or another, and also impact what kind of government takes charge thereafter. These developments are:

 

·         The launch of the MKP in December with Zuma’s backing, and Zuma subsequently becoming its leader, top election list candidate, and face of the MKP’s campaign.

·         The unexpected significant support indicated by polls for the MKP nationally and especially in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), suggesting it could even replace the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) as the third biggest party.

·         The hijacking of the MKP and the purging from the party of 5 of its founding interim leaders including its founder and previous leader, Jabulani Khumalo, by Zuma, his daughter, and their allies on accusations of being spies and working with “the enemy”, being the ANC.

·         The subsequent power struggle between Zuma and Khumalo, with Khumalo unsuccessfully requesting the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to remove Zuma from the ballot, while Khumalo could still turn to the courts for such a remedy. The IEC is also unable to remove the 5 expelled MKP members from the election candidates list.

·         The outcome of an appeal hearing in the Constitutional Court this Friday 10 May as to whether Zuma could remain on the ballot as a candidate for Parliament in view of his 15-month jail sentence in 2021 after the Electoral Court earlier ruled in his favour.

·         The outcome of an ongoing police investigation into allegations that the MKP forged many of the required number of signatures it submitted to the commission during the candidate nomination process, which if proven could lead to the removal of the MKP from the ballot.

 

The arrival in the election race of Zuma and the MKP and them garnering significant support nationally and in KZN, meant that election predictors had to recalculate the potential election outcome, and the government it may spawn. At the same time three of the latest opinion polls gave the ANC a mere 37% to 40% of the vote. But as I have repeatedly cautioned in the past, these possible support levels are all based on opinion polls which may be inaccurate for a variety of reasons. Nonetheless, they do indicate broad trends at the time of the poll. Also noticeable from these polls, was that it seemed the MKP was poaching a large slice of the EFF’s support nationally rather than from the ANC like Zuma had intended. However, in KZN it was taking away support from the ANC. Zuma’s strategic aim with the MKP was to weaken the ANC particularly in KZN where he still has substantial political clout, but also at the national level, in the hope that it would trigger the political demise of his arch enemy Cyril Ramaphosa and, one suspects because of Zuma’s continued membership of the ANC, to ensure his and his support faction’s possible return to again take control of the ANC after the elections.

 

Be that as it may, with the ANC’s election chances seemingly weakened to 40% or below, and with the MKP support appearing to surge, predictions of the ANC being forced into forming a coalition government now centred on the larger parties whose support the ANC would need to get over the 50% threshold. The smaller parties that the ANC could dominate and would allow the ANC to avoid excessive radicalisation, would at that margin not give it the numbers required to get to 50%. That would only be an option if the ANC got around 45% or more. This therefore has left as the only options for the ANC to partner with the EFF and/or the MKP on the left, or with one of the EFF or MKP plus a few smaller parties on the left, and the Democratic Alliance (DA) and other parties of the Multi-Party Charter (MPC) group on the centre-right.

 # To read the full Research Note, please contact Stef Terblanche at 076 647 8235 or stef.terblanche57@gmail.com